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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY M. NAGLE, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLUB FONITAINBLEU, ) 
a Utalh corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RE·SPON'DENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10198 
STA'TE'MENT ·OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is ~an ·action commenced by the P'lain'tiff 
for the specific performance of an agreement an·d 
assignment or, in the altern'ative, for a judgment 
against the Defendant for monies due and owing on 
an agreed account for improvements to re~a'l pro-
perty and for monies due on a promissory note and 
also for the foreclosure of 'the Plaintiff's mech'anic's· 
lien. 
DISPOSITION IN IJOWER co·uR·T 
The Plaintiff was awarded judgment against 
the Defend1ant in the amount of $19,738.48 and 
'$52.70 costs of court, lbut the trial court held that 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid_and the 
Agreement and Assignment between the parties, 
dated September 1, 196'2, provided for a penalty 
and could not be enforced. 
RELIEF SOU'GH·T ON AP1PEAL 
·The Res'pondent seeks to have thlis, Court sus-
tain those portions of the tri'al 'Court's judgment 
which held tllat Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was in-
valid and the Agreement an'd Assignment between 
the parties, dated September 1, 1962, to be a penalty 
and thus unenforceable. 
STATEMENT OF FkC1TS 
It is necessary for Defendant to set forth addi-
tional facts and to correct misstatement of some 
fa·cts in Appellant's brief with respect to tr~ansac­
tions 'between Appellant and Respon-dent and the 
relationship between these parties. Respondent, dur-
ing 19160, purch·ased two p-arcels of land at or near 
1651- Vine Street, Salt Lake City, U'tah, ~and these 
two parcels were purchased under separate Uni-
form Real Estate Contracts an·d not as one parcel 
of land. The ap·proxim~ate six acres of land which 
was sold to the Plaintiff-Appellant for residential 
building lots was origin·ally purChased by the Club 
an·d 'found to be too small for the Club purposes and 
was then sold to Appellan't un·der a Uniform Re~al 
EHtate Contract. The Respondent Purchased the 
present Club si1te of ap·proxim1ately 6.3'5 acres of 
2 
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land under a separate transaction. The Defendant 
in approximately May, 1960 agreed to share pro-
portionate~ly with the Plaintiff for moving of a 
cooler house, construction of water-sewer line, road-
way and bridge, and did request that invoices cor-
rectly showing the amount ex~pended for these ·par-
ticular projects be submitted to the Defen·dant. The 
Plaintiff submitted ·a billing of $12,2'77.26 which 
purported to be an itemized invoice but there was 
no indication whether or not some of the materials 
invoiced were used by the Plaintiff for construction 
in his subdivision or whether the en:tire amourrt was 
used in conneetion with the projects under the agree-
ment with the Defendant. The Defendant did ac-
cept the $12,277.26 figure as correct but at t~hat 
time requested that the Plaintiff submit separate 
invoices showing the dates of delivery of concrete, 
asphalt, and other materials:. T·he Defen·dant fur-
ther agreed to deposit $1,000.00 in trust with re-
spect to this contract but was verbally assured by 
the Plaintiff th!at this deposit was not necessary 
since the Club was in the midst of a promotion 
campaign and needed all of the money available 
for promotion and opening of the Club. 
Wi'fu respect to completion of the roadway and 
bridge, there was never any ·complaint from the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant that the roadway and 
bridge could not be com'ple'ted until October 15, 1962 
because Defendant failed to make payment to the 
plaintiff and, in fact, the only ·agreement was that 
3 
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of participation in costs. The roadway in question 
was bein·g put in by a subcontractor on behalf of 
the Plaintiff herein to serve the subdivision being 
built by the Plaintiff, and the work on the bridge 
was being done almost entirely by the Plaintiff per-
son·ally or with 'the ihelp of one or two of his work-
men. 'The completion of the bridge in question was 
necessary for access to the subdivision of the Pla'in-
tiff bul wa:s not necessary at all for ·access to the 
C1ub property ·and was, in fact, farther north on 
the roadway from the entrance to the Club property 
and was not used by· ·Club mem·bers for ingress to 
the Club property. 
The Board of Directors of the Defendant in 
early 19'62 had no understan·ding, verbal or other-
wise, that Plaintiff was to receive funds as new 
members~hi'ps were sold and, in fact, ~he Plaintiff 
assured the Board of Directors that he could dbtain 
materials and labor and complete the Clubhouse 
with little or no expenditure of money for a con-
siderable length of time after the m'a:tter was first 
discussed in the ea1~ly part of 1962. Considerable 
labor was donated by the members of the Club in 
this con·struction. Only one door in the Clubhouse 
was hung by the Plaintiff and was improperly hung 
so that it ·had to be corrected 'before winter, and the 
en1tire ·Clubhouse and pool'area was prepared for the 
winter by the Club members. 
4 
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ARGUMEN·T 
POINT I 
THAT T·HE TRI.A!L ·COURT DID NOT EIRRO·R IN 
HOLDING PLAINTIFF'S ·ME·CHANI1C,S LIEN INVALID. 
After the ·con~clusion of all te·stimony an·d evi-
dence, the trial court, by its Memorandum Deci-
sion, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment, held that the Pl,aintiff's ·mech-
anic's lien, Exhibit No. 10, was· invalid. While the 
Memorandum Decision . of the trial court does not 
state the reason for holding Plaintiff's mech·anic's 
lien invalid, and the Appellant would h'ave this 
Court believe th,a.t the trial court remarked to the 
effect that the $11,000.00 promissory note dated 
Septem:ber 1, 19·6'2 was given in payment of the 
claimed labor and material represented by the mech-
ani'c's l1ien, the fa~cts of this case would indicate 
otherwise. Un·der the facts of the case i't appe'ars 
that all of the contra·ct work done by the Plaintiff 
was completed durin~g ~he spring of 1962, with the 
exception of the hanging of one door in November, 
1962. It is admitted that the mechanic's lien was 
recorded on the 20th day of November, 196'2 which, 
according to the testimony presented, was ~at least 
five months after the work done by the plaintiff. 
This, coupled with the fact that the Plaintiff was 
a member of the Board of Directors of the Defend-
ant Club and had represented to the Board of Direc-
tors of the Club that he would do the work involved 
5 
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for little or no money, as eviden·ced by Exhibits 
Nos. 15 'and 16, and in view of the fact that much 
of the work performed was done by the Club mem-
bers, and since the last work claimed to be done 
by Plaintiff in November was that whi1c·h could be 
classified as trivial or minor, su1bstantiates the posi-
tion of the Defendant ;~hat 'the lien filed by the 
Plain tiff was not varid. 
This C'ourt has held that trivial or minor ad-
justments made casually or long after the main work 
has been eom:pleted cannot be used to tie onto as 
the last labor done or m~aterials furnished in order 
'to ·preserve or reinstate lien rights of 'a claimant. 
Wilcox vs. Clow,ard, et al, Utah 56 P2 1. 
It has never been ·claimed that the issuance 
of the note with its coin~ciding agreement was done 
'vith the intention to deprive the .Pl'aintiff of any 
lien rig~hts that he may have had, but there is little 
question that the facts show the time for filing 
liens had long expired at the time that Plaintiff pre-
p!ared and file'd the lien claimed in this action. The 
court was therefore correct in rul'ing that the Pl'ain-
tiff's mechanic's lien rights were not in effect and 
that his lien was invalid. 
POINT II. 
. THAT THE TRIAL C,O'URT DID NOT ERROR IN 
H'OLDING THAT TH'E AGREE'M'ENT AND ASSIGN-
M:E'NT BE'TWEEN THE PARTIES, DATE'D SEPTEM-
6 
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BER 1, 1962, WAS A PENALTY RA'THE!R THAN A 
FORFEJITURE. 
At the time of the trial of ~his matter, there 
was introduced into evidence as Exhibit P-25, a 
copy of the mi;nutes of the Board of Directors' meet-
in.g.of the Defendant Club, dated August 30, 1962. 
These miiriutes indica:te that at ·tha't meeting a prom-
i'ssory note ·and Lan·d Assignment Agreement had 
been submitted to the Board of Directors by the 
Plaintiff, Gary Nagle, for the Board's considera-
tion. T'he promissory note submitted was in the 
sum of $20,000.00, and as a result thereof there was 
considerable discussion ~among the members of the 
Board of Directors. It was determined by the Bo'ard 
of Directors that a note in the sum of $11,000.00, 
together with the Land Assignment Agreement, 
would be given to the Plaintiff. The sum of $11,-
000.00, as indicated by Exhi'bit P-25, was a com-
promise figure and was given in order to sati~sfy 
the claim of Mr. Nagle. The note and Land Assign-
ment were delivered to Mr. Don E. Hammill for 
redrafting in order that they conformed 'to 'the mo-
tions made and carried at the Board of Directors' 
meeting. This Land Agreement w·as no't prepared 
by Mr. Hammill, to the detriment of Mr. N1agle, 
but was the ~agreement submi'tted by Mr. Nagle ·and 
was substantially the same ·agreement, except for 
the amounts involved, after fue conelusion of 'the 
Board of Directors' meeting. Plaintiff's claim that 
he s'hould be pl:aced in an advantageous 'position by 
7 
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reason of the fact that Mr. Hammill, who was a 
practicing attorney, prepared the agreement to the 
detriment of Mr. Nagle, cannot be considered by 
this Court in view of the true facts. 
This Court has often held that the enforcement 
of a forfeiture provision allowing recovery, which 
bears no reasonable rel·ationship to actual! damages, 
should not be allowed. Western MG)caroni Mfg. Co. 
vs. Fiorre, 71 Utah 217 4, 264 P 9'75; Young vs. 
Hansen, 218 P2 666; Green vs. Nelson, Utah, 232 
P2 776. In the Utah case of Perkins, et al, vs. Spen-
cer, t21. Utah 4'68, 24'3 P2 44-6, The Supreme Court 
reiterated this position when it stated: 
"'This Court is committed to the doctrine that 
where the pai~ties to a contract stipulate the 
amount of liquidated damages that shall be 
paid in case of a breacll, such stipulation is, 
as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount 
stipulated is not disproportionate to the dam-
ages actual'ly sustained." 
The ·Court continued: 
"On the ·contrary, where enforcement of the 
forfei1ture provision would allow an uncon-
scionable and ex·horbitant recovery be·aring no 
reasonable relation to the actual dam·age suf-
fered, we h·ave uniformly held it to be unen-
forceable." 
'The Court, in addition to the holding of the 
Perkins case, held, in the ·case of Jacobson vs. 
Sw~an, 2718 P2 ·2'98: 
8 
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''When the Trial Judge has made such deter-
mination, we will regard it 'as prima facie 
correct and will not disturb it unless it is 
plainly erroneous." 
In Plaintiff's brief, 'he staters fue value of his 
claim ~as against the property values, in·dicafing that 
the net equity of 'the Defendant would ·be ap·proxi-
mately $'24,800.00, which is only $'5,000.00 more 
than the claimed judgment of the 'Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff, however, fails to advis-e the ~c~ourt of the 
value of the im~provements on the real property, 
which makes the claim fall witHin the rule in 
the Perkins vs. Spencer case, sup~a. Exhibit 
P-17 is a fin'anc1al statement of the Defeii'd'ant 
Corporation, whi·ch indi'cates thaJt lthe land value 
of 'the ·Corporati'On is $35,756.78, and that the value 
of the buildings and improvements is $7'2,803.84, 
or a total va'lue of $108,560.62. There is ·owing 
against the lan1d p11rchase contraet the sum of 
$26,200.00, leaving a net value of the assets at 
the sum of $82,360.62. This is the amount ~h·at was 
given to secure the claim of the promirssory note to 
the Plaintiff in the sum of $11,000.00, and it would 
certainly appear th'at if the Plaintiff were ~allowed 
to assume the Defendan't's position as regards the 
real property, for an $11,000.00 note, 1he would be 
obtain1ing real property and improvements worth 
$82,360.62. T·his certainly appears to be s:o grossly 
excessive 'a:s 'to ·be entirely ·disproportionate to any 
loss -contemplated by the ·parties, and that its en-
forcemen't would certain'ly be so shocking to the con-
scien~ce that fue trial court ~could, in all equity, re-
9 
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fuse to enforce the provision for forfeiture on the 
basis that it constituted a penalty. 
The Court's fin·dings of a penalty is again sup-
ported by the evidence that 'at the time, in April, 
1963, when Plaintiff advised the Defendant that he 
did not feel secure and was calling for payment of 
·his note before its maturity date, he was advised by 
the Board of Directors of Defendant Club that they 
would honor the note ·an·d m'ake payment upon it 
but would not pay attorney's fees since they did not 
concur in !his eonclusion that ~he Was no longer secure 
in his position. This offer was refused by the Plain-
tiff, who a short time thereafter filed 'legal action to 
collect on the note, even though payment was offered. 
The trial court decision in 't'his ma'tter certainly 
ap·pe'ars to be well within the rule of Jacobson vs. 
S1.oan, supra. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE DEFEN·DANT, THROUGH ITS CON-
DU'CT, HAS N·o·T W AIVE·D THE RIGHT TO QUESTION 
THE V kLIDITY O·F THE AGREEMENT AND ASSIGN-
MEN'T O·F SEPT'EMBER 1, 1962, AND IS N·OT ES-
TOP·PED FR'OM CLAJ!MING THAT IT EX.A!CTS A 'PEN-
ALTY. 
The promissory note and Agreement and As-
sign~ment of September 1, 19'62 were not prepared 
by the President of the Defendant Corporation, Mr. 
Don E. Hammill, a practicing attorney, ·as indicated 
by Plaintiff's brief. As 'heretofore stated and ~as 
shown by Exhiibit P-25, the note and Land Assign-
to 
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ment Agreement were prepared by Mr. Nagle or 
Mr. Nagle''S re·presentatives an·d ~presented to the 
Board of Directors of the Defendan't Corporation 
. . 
for their acceptance. The note ·and Lan!d Assignment 
Agreement were not a.cce·pted. by -the ·Board' of ·.Di-
rectors by reas'On of the fact that the sum involved 
was far in excess of the amoun't that the Board 
of Directors felt to be due and owing and, ~as a result 
theredf, a compromise amount was agreed upon, an·d 
Mr. Hammill was reque'sted to redraft the docu-
menlts to reflect the ·compromised figure. The docu-
mentswere redrafted in sulbstanti~aJly the same form 
as when ·presented by Mr. Nagle an·d were executed 
in conforman'ce with the decision of the Board of 
Directors. The purpose of the Agreement and the 
note was not to give 'the Club 'the sole ·benefit by 
reducing to a specific figure the undertermined 
amount theretofore existing between the parties 
hereto; there was also considerable benefit ·derived 
by the Plaintif in th!is action, since he received ·a 
note for a specific amount, wherein his claim prior 
to this time had been for an amount that was dis-
puted by the Defendant ·Corporation. From the ex-
Hibits presented, it is ap·parent that there was eon-
slidera:ble feeling an·d animosity between Mr. Nagle 
and the Board of Directors of the Defendant Club 
by reason of his staJtements th·a't the work ·could be 
done with little or no cost when, in fact, he pre-
sented to them a bill of S:U'bstantial size. 
11 
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By executing the note and Land Assignment 
Agreement in this action, the Defendant did not 
designedly induce the Plaintiff to change his con-
duct or alter his condition in reli'ance upon any rep-
resentation of the Plaintiff; in fact, the Defendant 
acted in accordance with the request of the Plain-
tiff; except for the amount to be paid, w'hich amount 
was agreed upon by the parties. 
The case of Rav1arino vs. Price, 123 Utah 5'59, 
260 P2 570, as cited by the Plaintiff, is distinguish-
able both on the f!acts an1d the law, since there were 
representations made in that case which were made 
for the purpose of influencing the conduc't of 'the 
injured party, which facts are certainly not present 
here. 
As fur\ther evidence of the fact that the De-
fendant, through its conduct, did not waive i'ts ri'ght 
to question the validity of tlle Agreements involved 
herein, we must again point to the Court the fact 
that when the Pla'intiff accelerated 'the maturity 
date of the n'ote 1by reason of :his claim of 'insecurity, 
that the Defen·dant Corporation offered to pay the 
face value of the note but refused to pay attorney's 
fees by reason of the fact that they ·did not concur 
in the necessity for the accelerated maturity date. 
This certainly seems to be within reason and would 
cer'tain'ly substantiate the position of the ·Defendant 
Corporation that they were ·able to pay the note as 
it matured. To permit the Defen·dant to refuse pay-
12 
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ment and then stand upon the claim for forfeiture 
would not be just or eq-uitable. 
CON·CLUSION 
It is strongly urged ·by the D·efendant herein 
that the trial court, having heard all of the testi-
mony and reviewed all of the exhibits, ·and being 
fully advised of the facts as they existed in this 
matter, rightfully determined tha;t the lien claim 
of the Defendant was invalid 1an·d that the Agree-
ment and Assignment of Sep'tem·ber 1, 1962 was a 
pena'lty an·d not a forfeiture. 
It is further urged that the trial court d1d nnt 
error in its decisions in this matter nor did it 
erroneouslly interpret the documents involved in this 
·case. 'The relative positions of the parties during 
the entire ·period of their association indicates that 
such association was other than the normal contrac-
tor-owner relationship and that Plaintiff's position 
of innocen·ce, as indicated by his brief, is not sub-
stantiated by the facts ·and evidence presented in 
this matter. 
It is therefore submitted by the Defen·dan't that 
the trial court's decision should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DANSIE, ELLETT AND 
HAMIMIDL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 
13 
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